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EDI~OR'S NOTE 
JOURNEY TO JUSTICE: 
FIFfIETH ANNIVERSARY OF 
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION· 
The Honorable Robert M. Bell has been on the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland since 1991 and was named Chief Judge in 1996. Born in 
Rocky Mount, North Carolina, Chief Judge Bell attended Dunbar 
High School in Baltimore and graduated from Morgan State College 
in 1966. He earned his J.D. from Harvard University Law School in 
1969 and was admitted to the Maryland Bar that year. 
While a student at Dunbar, he participated in a sit-in demonstration 
in 1960 to protest segregation in Baltimore. About a dozen students 
were arrested and convicted of trespass after they refused to leave a 
Baltimore restaurant unless they were served. The court of appeals 
affirmed their convictions. The case was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
to the Maryland courts. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the 
convictions for a second time, but eventually reversed after granting a 
motion for reconsideration. The latter decision was based upon a 
1962 Baltimore City ordinance that prohibited owners of places of 
public accommodations from <;lenying their services to people because 
of their race. 
The following is a speech Chief Judge Bell gave about the demon-
stration and the appeal to the Supreme Court. The speech was part of 
a celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education 
at the University of Baltimore School of Law in the spring of 2004. 
JOURNEY TO JUSTICE: FIFfIETH ANNIVERSARY OF 
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
The Honorable Robert M. Bell 
Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland 
April 14, 2004 
I am here, ladies and gentlemen, to talk to you about my exper-
iences during the era after Brown against Board of Education. 1 Cer-
tainly, when Brown against Board of Education was decided, I was ten 
years old. In fact, I became eleven that summer. I was attending at 
that time an elementary school, Charles C. Carrollton on Central Ave-
nue. It was two years later that I got to Dunbar. At that time, I moved 
to Dunbar Junior High School, which was an annex to the main build-
ing. I didn't get to the main building until 1956, I think it was, and 
quite frankly when I got to Dunbar, when I was at Charles Carroll of 
Carrol ton, not much changed between April of 1954, May of 1954, 
September of 1954, or September of 1955 and so forth because the 
school I went to in 1954, 1955 and so on until I graduated in '56, 
remained a segregated school. We had at Dunbar, interestingly 
enough, some integration, I should point that out; there was a history 
teacher at Dunbar by the name of Herman Bainder, and he was the 
only white teacher in the school. There were no white students at all. 
And yet we knew about Brown against Board of Education. 
I remember when the decision was announced. I used to sell Ajros,2 
and I remember the headlines surrounding that case. It was a big 
deal, and it was a big deal in the school system. In fact, I know of 
students who were asked to move from their school to another school, 
a white school, for the sake of integrating that school. It was done 
very carefully, very controlled. And at one point, not early on, but at 
some point, I was asked to do the same, but I declined to do so. What 
I'd like to do is first of all point out that notwithstanding the fact that 
Brown against Board of Education did not have an immediate impact 
on my life, it had a significant impact on my life. That may sound 
contradictory to you, but it's true. 
My odyssey began in 1960, and it had to do with the aftermath of 
Brown as opposed to Brown itself, obviously. I was elected president of 
the student government at Dunbar High School in the spring of 1960. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. The Mro-Arnerican Newspaper was founded in 1892 and continues to be 
published today. The Mro-Arnerican Newspaper, About Us, at http:/ / 
www.afro.com/aboutus.htm.(LastvisitedNov.11. 2004). 
1 
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As an aside, it might interest you to know the vice presidential candi-
date on that ticket was a gentleman by the name of Reginald F. Lewis. 
For those of you who don't know Reginald F. Lewis, he's the fellow 
who did the leveraged buyout of Beatrice International. 3 He was my 
classmate at Dunbar. We were student government president and vice 
president together. 
It was interesting that right after that I was contacted by Morgan 
students. They were planning a sit-in demonstration, picketing in the 
City of Baltimore, to be held on the last day of school in 1960. That 
would have been June the 17th. And they were going to do something 
a little bit different. They were going to involve, in addition to college 
students, they were going to involve high school students. And so one 
of the Morgan State College4 students came to Dunbar High School. 
We met and discussed what my role would be. My role was simply to 
get the word out and to recruit students to fill a bus so that we could 
go downtown on the last day of school and engage in picketing and 
some sit-in demonstrations should the occasion arise. 
The idea was to have students who were able to get their parents' 
permission, obviously, and students who were not going to be disrup-
tive in the sense that once you got involved in a picket situation, you 
couldn't have students who would retaliate or react to what was being 
said or done to them, students who would be able to follow the dic-
tates of the nonviolent movement. Also, a requirement was that be-
cause we were going to do some sit-ins, and because we were going to 
be attempting to buy some goods, you had to have some money and 
be prepared to spend money in the event that you were served. So my 
job was to amass that group of students and get them to sign permis-
sion slips, and then we would take the bus that day. And I got a bus-
load of students. 
Now, as another aside, I should point out that in 1960, I was begin-
ning my junior year. So that meant that I was sixteen years old, and 
that was the case of most of the students who were recruited, they 
were sixteen years old or older. Some of them happened to be seniors 
already and were finishing school so those students might have been 
seventeen. But for the most part the high school students were under 
eighteen years old. I don't know whether anybody gave much 
thought to that or not. It might have been a great strategy if a sixteen-
year-old in Baltimore city had been ajuvenile, because you could have 
had the arrest for picketing done, and you would only go to juvenile 
court without having to run the risk of a criminal offense or a criminal 
3. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 2000 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 
2917, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
4. Morgan State College became Morgan State University in 1975. State 
Agency Histories at the Maryland State Archives, at http://www. 
mdarchives.state .md. us/ msa/ refserv / staghist/html! sh62.html. (Last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2004). 
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conviction. But in Baltimore in those days, if you were sixteen years 
old, you were not a juvenile, you were an adult, and you were tried as 
such. The anomaly is, of course, that if you lived in Baltimore County, 
or Montgomery County, or some other county other than Baltimore 
city, you were a juvenile. And so that's just another sidelight to this 
thing, because some years later, of course, that issue was corrected 
because there was a lawsuit brought and, under equal protection 
grounds, that disparity of treatment was corrected. 
In any event, we went downtown to Baltimore Street. And the first 
stop was Reeds Drugstore. By the way, everybody knows that in Febru-
ary of 1960, there were sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, at A&T, 
four students at A&T. A lot of people believe that that was the first sit-
in demonstration. It was not. The first one occurred in the '40s, at a 
Jack Sprat restaurant in Chicago, and it was conducted by Jim Farmer 
and George Houser.5 And indeed, Baltimore had sit-in demonstra-
tions occur in the' 50s. And as a result of that, there were a couple of 
chains that integrated. The '50s was the beginning of the attempt to 
integrate Gwynn Oak Park and other amusement centers. That took a 
number of years from the '50s to succeed. In fact, when I was at Mor-
gan, it was still going on. Sit-ins were going on at Gwynn Oak Park, it 
was going on at shopping centers, and the movie theaters. So the sit-
in demonstration itself as a strategy was not new to Greensboro. It was 
not the original idea of the A&T students. It had already been tried. 
It did not take hold. It did not get the attention that the sit-in demon-
strations got once they started in Greensboro and moved their way up 
the east coast. 
It has been suggested that part of the reason for the notoriety had 
to do with the fact that a lot of the sit-in demonstrations occurred in 
the South and generated a great deal of reaction to it of a negative 
sort, which reaction was seen on the evening news. And it caused the 
American people to focus on that situation, to see some of the inhu-
manity and some of the violent treatment of the supporters of sit-in 
demonstrators, and to have a good deal of sympathy for them. That's 
one suggestion. Another suggestion is that it had something to do 
with the Sharpsville massacre in South Africa, which also was a demon-
stration of man's inhumanity to man. I have my own theory. 
One of my theories is that it had something to do with the decision 
which said that state-sanctioned segregation is illegal and unconstitu-
tional. I think Brown had something to do with the willingness of 
these young people to go at it hammer and tongs, so to speak, to at-
tempt to move Brown to the next step. One will recall, of course, that 
Charles Hamilton Houston's theory was that you would attack segrega-
tion with an idea of ultimately getting rid of discrimination. You'd 
5. Richard Severo,James Farmer, Civil Rights Giant in the 50's and 60's, is Dead at 
79, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 1999, at AI. 
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start by making it too expensive to continue the separateness, he 
would continue until he was able to get rid of separate but equal alto-
gether, and then get rid of discrimination. It was interesting that dur-
ing the time of the Brown decision, one of the cases, a Virginia case,6 
one of the rationales for maintaining segregation was that the segre-
gated schools prepared the students for the life they would face 
outside of school. 7 That is to say, if we desegregated the schools, what 
we have really done is to give black students false hope because what 
would be happening outside the walls of the school was that you 
would be in a segregated society. All we would be doing, the Virginia 
court said, is preparing these young people to deal with what reality is 
going to provide for them.8 So I think that this was the natural pro-
gression from Brown, to begin to try to break down some of these bar-
riers, one of which was public accommodations. 
When one thinks back [one] reaiizes that not being able to have 
access to public accommodations was a real sore spot for Mrican 
Americans who wanted to go on vacation. Back then, if you were Mri-
can American, you would leave Baltimore going south, and would 
drive, and don't stop at a hotel or stop at a restaurant to have food, 
you just drove. You would take your greasy bag with you, with your 
chicken in it, and would take sodas in a cooler. You stopped only for 
gas or you stopped in a town where you knew somebody who would 
put you up; you couldn't stop in a town with a hotel even though they 
may have vacancies, because the hotel would not provide you with ac-
commodations. So it was an issue for Mrican Americans throughout 
the entirety of their history of being free and their history of attempt-
ing to do those things which everybody else did: find a little recrea-
tion while on vacation, go back home from time to time. 
In any event, I do digress. I really want to get to what it was like. We 
went downtown and we stopped at the Reeds Restaurant-the Reeds 
Drug Store-and we picketed that particular establishment. Now that 
was the first time I had ever really experienced the overt, the vicious, 
racism. Because when we picketed that establishment, there was a 
counter-picket. People gathered, they watched. But they did more 
than watch. You had epithets being thrown about. You had a few 
students being hit. And you had a continual stream of chatter, which 
had to do with the physical characteristics of the students who were 
involved and threats as to what could, or would, happen to them. And 
that continued for the entirety of the time that we were on the picket 
line. That lasted for about forty minutes. 
Then we decided, a group of us, to peel off and go to see if there 
was a restaurant that was open and, if there was, we would sit in at the 
6. Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
7. See id. at 339. 
8. See id. 
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restaurant. Now, we had been there for about forty minutes, and most 
of the stores along the street-we're on Baltimore Street-most of the 
stores along the street had closed. They shut their doors. And they 
had decided to take the loss as it were, except for one. That was 
Hooper's Restaurant, at the corner of Charles and Baltimore. We 
went in and the hostess greeted us and indicated what the policy was: 
We do not serve Mrican Americans. She said, "We do not serve 
colored in this store." And when questioned about it a little more 
closely, she said that was the policy that had been given to her by the 
manager, and the manager subsequently came out and indicated that 
was the policy of the owner of the business, Mr. Hooper, who, by the 
way, was there. 
As we were talking to the hostess, some of us moved around her as 
she tried to block the door and we sat at various tables. Now, one of 
the instructions we were given was when you got into the place, each 
of you sit at a different table and ask to be served. So there were 
twelve people in the group, and so we took up as many of those tables 
as we could. 
Our leader was a gentleman by the name of John Quarles. John 
Quarles conversed with the hostess, and after the hostess had called 
the manager, he conversed with the manager and ultimately, he 
conversed with the owner of the establishment. While early on, the 
manager went out and got police officers and they came in and they 
did what they were supposed to do: They read to each of us the tres-
pass statute and demanded that we leave. We of course refused to do 
so. And they asked the police officer-before that, Mr. Hooper sat 
down with John Quarles, and he tried to reason with him. His point 
was: "Look, I'm not personally a bigot, I don't discriminate myself. 
However, .,my customers will not abide having Mrican Americans 
served in this establishment. And so it's a business decision, it's a mat-
ter of economics. If I serve you, then I lose customers, and you all are 
not going to be able to keep me open. And by the way, I hire a lot of 
black folk, they're all in the kitchen, they're my cooks. And please go 
back and talk to them and they will tell you that I do a good job, that 
I'm good to them, that they would like for you to go away and not do 
this." And of course Quarles declined. 
And so the police were asked to arrest us. The police declined to 
make the arrest. They said you have to swear out a warrant. And of 
course, while we were sitting there, Mr. Hooper went down to the cen-
tral district police station which was about three or four blocks away, 
and he went down, he swore out the warrant. And he came back and 
it was at this point that I realized how good a negotiator John Quarles 
was. John Quarles said to him, ''You've got the warrant." He said to 
the police officer, "Why don't we do this: Why don't we let these stu-
dents, these young people, go home." This is a Friday afternoon, the 
last day of school on that particular year was a Friday. "Let them go 
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home and they will report to you at the station house on Monday 
morning." And they discussed that for a time and agreed that we 
would not actually, physically, be arrested. We would be allowed to go 
home and report on Monday morning. 
And that's what happened. We were released to go home we went 
on Monday morning and at that time we were fingerprinted, we were 
photographed. The charges were filed. We were given copies and 
were given a court date. The trial was to be held in the municipal 
court. The case was scheduled for the municipal court. We were re-
fused trial in the district court, the case was sent down to-in those 
days it was called the Supreme Bench of Baltimore. 
Now, the group that sponsored the sit-in demonstration and the 
picketing was not only Morgan State College students, but it was also 
the Civic Interest Group. They supplied us with lawyers. The lawyers 
that we were supplied with were Robert Watts, Juanita Jackson Mitch-
ell, and Tucker Dearing. The case was tried in the Supreme Bench of 
Baltimore, right in the courthouse downtown on the second floor. If 
anyone has been in that courthouse, if you came in on the St. Paul 
Street side and you make a left-hand turn, the first courtroom on the 
left is the courtroom in which the case was tried. 
The case was presided over by Joseph Byrnes. Joseph Byrnes is the 
father of John Carroll Byrnes and Norris Byrnes. They're both judges 
now. An interesting sideline to that is when I was appointed judge in 
'75, the state senator representing my district was John Carroll Byrnes. 
And he was the one who stood for me and vouched for me and got me 
confirmed. 
There was a rule on witnesses invoked, which means that the de-
fendants remained outside of the courtroom for the bulk of the trial. 
The testimony that was presented was presented by the hostess who 
testified as to the manner in which we behaved when we got there; the 
manager [who] testified to his attempts to divert us away from the 
place; and Hooper, who interestingly enough testified to his conversa-
tion as "negotiations with Quarles." 
And on the flip side, we had Quarles who testified, and one or two 
other students testified. I don't have the slightest idea how they chose 
the students who testified. The bulk of the testimony however was to 
the effect that we were there in an attempt to be served, that we were 
prepared to pay for what we were served, and that we were not trying 
to cause any trouble. And the reason we didn't leave is because we 
had not been served. So it was fairly standard testimony. I didn't no-
tice at the time, but the idea was to set up a scenario where the issue 
that was presented to the court was a legal issue, a very straightforward 
legal issue. And that [issue] was whether or not state action by enforc-
ing a criminal statute could be found such that it would offend the 
Constitution in the context where the person using the state resources 
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is discriminating against a segment of the society. That was the whole 
point. 
Joseph Byrnes was troubled by the case. He decided that he had no 
choice but to find each of us guiity. And he was absolutely right. We 
did go on private property; we did refuse to leave when requested to 
do so after having had the statute read to us. It was straightforward, 
factual. The predicate was there. And yet, he sought to find a way to 
moderate the punishment. He imposed a fine of ten dollars and he 
suspended it. In the course of doing so he pointed out to us that we 
were not criminals and he expressed some remorse himself for having 
to do what he felt he was compelled to do. 
Now Tucker Dearing, immediately after the pronouncement of the 
sentence, indicated to the court that he was going to appeal the judg-
ment. And, in fact, that's what happened. The case was appealed to 
the Court of Appeals. Now, there was no intermediate appellate court 
in those days. You went from the trial court to the Court of Appeals. 
And so, the case was heard in front of the Court of Appeals about a 
year or so later.9 And the issue presented was whether you could use a 
trespass statute to enforce a discriminatory policy when you are open-
ing your private concern, establishment, for public accommoda-
tions. 10 The Court of Appeals had no trouble with that particular 
proposition. It ruled fairly quickly that there was no state action. 11 
The case was presented for eert. to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari.12 It's an interesting interplay here. The Supreme 
Court granted eert. about a year after the decision in the Court of Ap-
peals,13 which is unusual. Normally, you get the eert. grants a little 
quicker than that. And it took them-after they granted eert.-and the 
arguments were heard-it took them another eight months or so to 
decide the case 14 because there was a real split on the Court. 
Before this case, most of the civil rights cases had been decided 
unanimously. Earl Warren had been pretty good about getting a 
unanimous court.15 But here, when you're dealing with private prop-
erty, there was really a lot of heat generated. One person who had 
always been fairly liberal in terms of civil rights was Black, Hugo 
Black. 16 And Hugo Black was a champion of private property inter-
9. Bell v. State, 227 Md. 302,172 A.2d 771 (1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
10. Bell v. State, 227 Md. at 304, 172 A.2d at 771. 
11. Id. 
12. Bell v. Maryland, 374 U.S. 805 (1963). 
13. Id. 
14. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (Douglas,]., concurring). 
15. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 285 (1963) (unanimous decision). 
16. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1,6 (1971) (holding that the 
First Amendment prevented the Arizona State Bar from refusing to admit a 
woman based on her membership in the Communist Party). 
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estsP Earl Warren wanted very much to get to the constitutional is-
sue and decide that you cannot use a trespass statute in a public 
accommodations context to enforce the private discrimination on the 
part of the storeowner. So too did most of the people who follow the 
history of the Court, so too did Douglas. Brennan, interestingly 
enough, was trying to forge a majority. The way this case came out on 
the first vote was five to four to affirm the Court of Appeals. But Tom 
Clark from Texas switched his vote. And when he switched his vote, 
we ended up with a Court that was evenly divided. There were three 
justices, Douglas, Goldberg, and Warren who wanted to reach the con-
stitutional issue and to reverse. IS There were three justices, Black, 
Harlan, and White, who wanted to reach the constitutional issue and 
affirm.19 And three, Stewart, Clark, and Brennan, who wanted to de-
cide the case on a more narrow issue.2o 
The case was never decided on the constitutional issue. It was sent 
back to the Maryland Court of Appeals for its review, because in 1963 
Baltimore city passed a public accommodations law, and as a result of 
that law, what we had done was no longer a crime.21 In fact, we had 
the right to do it; it would have been a crime for the restaurant owner 
to have refused to serve US. 22 SO a right had been substituted in that 
situation. Brennan reasoned that, generally, if a law is repealed 
before the conviction becomes final, the result is' that the conviction is 
reversed unless there is a savings clause that specifically says that the 
repeal will not affect the conviction which is already in place.23 He 
suggested that the Court of Appeals ought to be given the opportunity 
to look at the situation again, and he suggested that they ought to 
reverse the case.24 
Douglas was totally upset by that; Douglas said, a whole lot is going 
on out here in this world today, and people are waiting for a resolu-
tion of this particular issue.25 In fact, he pointed out that there were 
about four or five cases before the Court, that term, which they had 
reversed on narrow grounds. There was the consideration by the 
United States Congress of a public accommodations law-a civil rights 
act-and there was no reason to suspect that young people and others 
would not, from that time forward, attempt to do exactly the same 
thing: to picket and to sit-in at these various restaurants to gain equal-
17. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) 
(holding that the President did not have the authority to direct the Secre-
tary of Commerce to take possession of the nation's steel mills). 
18. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 286 (Goldberg,]., concurring). 
19. Id. at 318 (Black,]., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 228. 
21. Id. at 228-30. 
22. Id. at 228-29. 
23. Id. at 231-32. 
24. Id. at 237, 241-42. 
25. Id. at 243 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
2004] Journey to Justice 9 
ity in the public accommodations area.26 So we ought to, he said, we 
ought to decide this case.27 We can't put our heads in the sand and 
hope it goes away.28 Black took the same position except he took it on 
the other side.29 He said that we need to decide the case so that every-
body knows the deck with which they are playing.30 
Of course, because there was no clear-cut majority, the narrow 
ground prevailed and the case was sent back to the Court of Ap-
peals.3) The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.32 It did not 
buy Brennan's formulation of the issue.33 It bought his formulation 
of the issue, but it did not buy Brennan's analysis.34 It believed that 
the savings clause did in fact save the convictions.35 And that was a six 
to one decision with Rubin Oppenheimer writing a dissent.36 
So you say to yourself, why are you here? How can you be Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals [of Maryland] with a conviction on your 
record? Well the answer is there was a motion for reconsideration 
filed within a month of the decision by the Court of Appeals, and the 
court granted the motion, which is a terribly unusual thing for the 
court to do.37 We rarely grant motions for reconsideration. And with-
out an opinion, some five or six months later, the court reversed the 
convictions.38 
Now, I thought I had a problem, quite frankly, as I was going back 
and refreshing myself on some of this. I looked at the case and the 
opinion was issued on October the 22nd, 1964.39 The motion for re-
consideration was filed November 23rd, 1964.40 So I went back and I 
got onto Google and I found a 1964 calendar and I wanted to make 
sure that the 22nd was a Sunday. And it was. So I'm okay. 
The unfortunate thing is that that issue-whether you can use a 
state trespass statute to enforce private discrimination in the public 
accommodations context-has never been decided by the Supreme 
Court. It has never been decided by the Supreme Court for a couple 
of reasons, one of which I suspect is that the Civil Rights Law had a 
26. See id. at 243-45 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
27. Id. at 242-43 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
28. See id. at 244-45 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
29. See id. at 321-23 (Black, j., dissenting). 
30. See id. at 322-23 (Black, J. dissenting). 
31. Id. at 242. 
32. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 368-69, 204 A.2d 54, 60-61 (1964). 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 369, 204 A.2d at 6l. 
37. Id. at 356, 204 A.2d at 54. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
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provision for public accommodationsY And so there was no occasion 
to get that issue back. 
I subsequently, and this is just something that happened, I hap-
pened to run into Brennan when he was giving a lecture at NYU back 
in the late '80s. And so I walked up to him ... after he had given his 
talk and I introduced myself to him. And I said my name is Robert M. 
Bell, and I'm the Robert Mack Bell in Bell against Maryland. And he 
remembered the case. And the one thing he said to me was, he said 
the one thing he did regret was that he had never the opportunity, 
and he could not get that particular case decided. It has been sug-
gested that Brennan was trying to avoid the issue, but he confirmed 
that that's not the case. What he was trying to do was to amass a ma-
jority and he did not have a majority, nobody had a majority for any 
one position. The only way you could get Tom Clark was by the nar-
row grounds. The only way he could get Stewart and Clark was by the 
narrow grounds, although Brennan himself would have voted with the 
Chief Justice and the otp.er two and would have reversed. So there 
was one vote short and they could never reach that result. 
Indeed, it turns out, of all of those cases before the Court, the only 
one that had the possibility of presenting that issue squarely, or that 
did present that issue squarely, was this case. But it also points out 
very clearly how divisive this issue of private property can be. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-l (2001). 
